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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

The issue

involved in this case centers on the constitutionality

and moral justification of the classifications based on marital status
and personal life style which were created by the Individual Income
Tax Act of

1973.

It is the contention of the Appellant that such are unnecessary,
unreasonable, and arbitrary as it requires individuals (with the
same amount of taxable income) to pay personal income tax at variable
rates based on circumstances that are irrelevant to the need for any
such distinction.

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT

Defendent's Motion to Dismiss the Warrent of Judgement of the Tax
Commission of the State of Utah was denied as the judge had no authority
to do othen1ise.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant requests the Court to:
1.

Reverse the decision of the Lower Court from which
appeal is being made.

2.

Order the Utah State Tax Commission to refund overpayment
made by appellant in the amount of $494.36.

Declare that portion of the 1973 Income Tax Law which sets
differential tax rates based on marital status an~ ~ers?nal
life style as an unreasonable and arbitrary class1f1cat1on
and,
therefore, unconstitutional.
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If the Court does not see fit to do the above, appellant requests
that the Court order that current tax law be made consistent whereby
all taxes paid within the State of Utah (i.e., sales and property),
be collected or asses<od at variable rates based upon the marital
status or personal life style of the taxpayer as is now provided by
the State Income Tax.

STATEtmn OF FACTS

As a result of the enactment of the Individual Income Tax Act of
1973 which created a differential in income tax rates based on circumstances of marital status and personal life style rather than on income
itself, aop2llant has refused to voluntarily pay the tax differential
whicr

·"

311:cu~t

above

1~hatever

the lowest rate may be (in this case,

married, filing jointly) on the same taxable income Qmount.
From 1974 through 1977 the appellant has petitioned the Tax Commissicr
under provision of Section 59-14A-72 of the Utah Code, for a "redetermination of deficiency"

with the intent of pro vi ding the means whereby

appellant could apply to the Utah State Supreme Court (59-14A-76) for
a "writ of certiorari or

revie\~

for the purpose of having the lawfulness

of such decision inquired into and determined."
During this period of time the Tax Commission refused to provide
due process by contending that the only point at issue was an error
in "mathematical com[Jutation" (59-14A-75) which therefore prevented
application to the Supreme Court for review.
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In March of 1978 the Tax Commission was persuaded by the appellant
to have issued a warrant for delinquent income tax in the amount of
$482.79 and to appear in Court to answer concerning his property.
This was done with the intent of allowing for due process and
providing a means for appeal to the Utah State Supreme Court.
On May 31, 1978 the appellant appeared in the Third Judicial
District Court on a Supplemental Proceeding.

His Motion to Dismiss

the judgement filed by the State Tax Commission was denied.
A Designation of Record on Appeal was filed with the Clerk of
the Third District Court on June 28, 1978.

POINT I:

That portion of the present Utah State Income Tax which
bases tax rates on marital status and personal life style
is an unreasonable and arbitrary Legislative classification.

The most important and most valid point in the argument for the
relief sought by the appellant is based on Article I, Section 24 of
the Constitution of the State of Utah which states in summary that
"all laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
Appellant proposes to establish that:
1.

The Income Tax of the State of Utah is a law of general nature.

2.

That there is no justifiable basis for differential treatment
in tax rates based on marital status and personal life style
circumstances and that such is unreasonable and arbitrary.

3.

That there is no fair reason for the income tax law (as it
presently exists) to not apply it equally in extension to those
it leaves untouched.
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The Individual Income Tax law of the State of Utah is general in
nature and universally applicable as evidenced by Section 59-14A-5 of
the Utah Code which states that " ... a tax is hereby imposed on the State
taxable income, as defined in Sections 59-14A-10 and 59-14A-11, of
every resident individual, and every nonresident individual. .. "
Except for its progressive nature (based on increased taxable income)
the State Income Tax until 1973 \vas also universally applicable in its
rate structure to all persons with the same taxable income.
As a result of the changes in income tax law in 1973 the uniform
operation of the law ceased, even though its general nature continued.
This in and of itself should be sufficiently convincing to establish
that the present law is contrary to general constitutional intent as is
stated in Section 24 that" ... all laws shall operate uniformly wherever
uniform laws can te erected."
operate uniformly

6~

1t

The State income tax can be enacted to

obviously did prior to 1973.

Section 24 continues that the " ... object and purposes of la1·1 present
touchstone for determing proper and improper classification," and that
"one who assails legislative classification as arbitrary has burden of
proving it to be such."
What then was the object or purpose of the ueation of these classifications where there were none, and where they were already operating
uniformly?

It is assumed that if there were no

justifiable purpose for

the classifications then they would be arbitrary, and furthermore, if
there were no reasonable differentiation between classes as relating to
the purposes to be accomplished by the income tax law, then they would
again be arbitrary.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

Obviously the basic intent of the 1973 Income Tax Act was to
parallel the Federal Income Tax law for purposes of administrative
convenience.
objective.
wher~

The appellant does not deny this to be a legitimate
However, in the creation of various tax rate structures

one pays more than another with both having the same taxable

income, then the question of fairness immediately arises, especially
when nothing of substance changed in the circumstances of the two
individuals from one year to the next (i.e., 1972 to 1973).
It is evident that legislative intent was not totally concerned
about administrative convenience or paralleling the Federal tax
classification structure as one, it did not include the "Head of Household" filing status and secondly, one basic progressive rate as previously existed was at least as convenient to administer as the three
established, regardless of whether it corresponded to the Federal or not.
Legislative action for purposes of administrative convenience is
one thing, however, when it affects the individual taxpayer adversly
and for no apparent reason, then it must be justified on a more substantial basis than mere ''administrative convenience."
As the line of thinking of the Court will no doubt lead to an
examination of the reasoning behind the existing Federal tax filing
structure, the appellant has included a copy of a Federal Tax Court
and Court of Appeals decision which focuses on the reasoning and
supposed justification of the subject at issue.
2:

(See Appendices

and

Federal Tax Court, Vivien Kellems, Docket No. 427-70, 6-27-72, and

same, U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit, Docket No. 74-2122, 4-4-73).
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Let it be understood that the appellant makes reference to the
above Federal court decisions for purposes of illustration only and for
the convenience of you, the Supreme Court.

The appellant strongly

objects to the Utah State Supreme Court finding reason to justify
changes in the State tax law based on Federal statute.

The issue at

hand is State legislative action regardless of Federal precedence.
It is, however, important to briefly examine the supposed Congressionc
line of reasoning which created the current tax differential based on
marital status and personal life style.

You will note from this particular

case that two" ... rational basis for distinction" are given:
1.

The geographic equalization of taxpayers as between community
and non-community property states.

2.

The recognition of the greater financial burdens of married
persons.

Little

cr~~'~

~eed

be made regarding point number one, as any

conflict in tax administration between community and non-community
property is totally irrelevant to the requirements of the Individual
Income Tax of the State of Utah.
No doubt in 1948 when this became a problem, the Congressional
action taken seemed reasonable to many.

Thirty years later this is

certainly not the case, and to use it as justification to perpetuate
an unreasonable system of classification is for the most part a red
herring response.

To say that one inequity must continue because of

the existence of another law which in itself is inequitable is begging
the question.

It is like saying you cannot go for a walk because you

have a rock in your shoe and leaving it at that.
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The second point having to do with "the greater financial burden
of married persons" is the only serious justification for the classification that the appellant is aware of, although at times some verbalize
that single people deserve to be penalized for not being married.
If there is, or ever was, any validity to the present classification
system, it comes down to one issue which is the second point mentioned.
In 1948 it may have appeared that this was a reasonable extension of
the "ability to pay" theory, but today that is for the most part a myth.
The appellant submits his own situation as an example:

In 1970 the

appellant v1as employed in the State of Michigan at an annual salary of
$13,500 with his wife earning approximately $1,000 from part time work.
As a result of a divorce, he returned to Salt Lake City to be closer to
where his former wife and son were residing.
annual salary of $10,000.

He began employment at an

His former wife r....u vu"'"'t" t•"f.l'oyment at

approximately $5,000 per year.

In 1973 the appellant purchased a one-

bedroom condominium for $17,000 with a monthly payment and service fee
of $170.

His former wife was renting a duplex at $150 per month.

An

approximate breakdown of their monthly income and living expenses in
1973 compared to when married in 1970 is as follows:

(see next page)
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Monthly I ncor1e/
Expenses
Gross Income
Taxes and Ded.
Take-home P"Y
House payment/rent
Food
Clothing
Insurance
Utilities
Contributions
Recreation
Installment Payments
Transportation
Child Support
Mi see ll aneous
Savings
TOTALS

~art_

Former \life

When

r~

$ 1,066
266
800

$ 570
67
503

$ 1,208
292
916

170
60
10
35
30
30
40
150
50
120
100
5

150
100
15
10
45
40
20
15
40

145
125
'30
30
60
65
30
110
80

75
-7

140
101

$ 800

$ 510

$

916

This above 1ce1111"-ation of income and expenses is sufficiently
accurate to substantiate the fact (and the appellant and his former
wife would testify to such) that neither of them had an increased
"ability to pay" income taxes at a higher rate as a result of their
change in marital status.
contrary.

In fact, the situation was more to the

They were both suddenly faced with the necessity of main-

taining two separate households with no expenses being reduced that
at the same time were not balanced off by increases in others and
substantial decreases in individual income.

At least in their case
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(when married) they did have more funds available for savings and nonnecessities than in either category of "single" or "head of household,"
and their situation does not appear to be that much different than many
others in similar circumstances.
This should not be surprising.

Whether married, single or head of

household, the basic and essential expenses are for the most part fixed.
The only really significant variable is the number of children, which
(if not fairly treated) is at least acknowledged in the provision for
"exemrtions."
For a moment let us assume that in

~married

households only one

person were employed and at the same time had several children.

That

would at least cause one to reflect on the desirability of manipulating
the tax structure for the purpose of accomplishing or supporting what
were considered to be socially desirable goals.
Many years ago this may have been the case.
situation has changed dramatically.

However, now the

Now in at least half the married

households both parties are employed outside the home and at the same
time average family size has decreased substantially.

The end result

largely negating whatever validity there may have been to any lessening
of ability to pay income taxes in comparison to single or hearl of household status.
Leaving aside for the moment the appellants own personal circumstances and bias, lets look for a moment at the situation of others who
are less fortunate than himself in regard to the issue under discussion.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The status of two particular groups of people deserves special note:
1.

First of all there are thousands of adult single people
in the State who for whatever reason(s) are not marriedwhich very often is not a matter of cho·ice, but because
of circumstances largely beyond their control. Their
desires are the same as a married person; one of the most
important of which is that of getting out of an apartment
and owning their own home. The majority of these individuals are women who are in lower paying unskilled jobs. It
goes without saying that such an individual with one income
would at least have as equal a dificulty in being-able to
obtain financing and making the payments on a purchased
dwelling as a married couple with two incomes. The appellant would assume there would be no disagreement as to
their equal right to become a homeowner.

2.

Secondly, there is the large number of single parent "head
of households" (again mostly women) v1ho are in a similar
situation as the above and perhaps with even a greater
need and desire to have their own home, yet must do so on
one income.
What is the essential difference (that justifies a different
:ax rate) between the status of a single parent with two
:h: lc,·e~ with an incorne of $10,000 per year, and a married
couple with one child maktng ~10,000 annually?
Treating people in such a manner is not only unreasonable
and arbitrary, it is cruel--especially v1hen most of them
accept their status in life and the benevolence of their
government with resignation.

The appellant admits he is not able to "prove" the foregoing
assumptions or conclusions, but at the same time maintains that with
the combination of v1hat is really common knowledge and the use of
common sense, the v1eight of evidence would lean in the direction of
his position.
Regarding the issue of the "head of household" status:

The

present neglect of due consideration will probably be ackno11ledged
through a recommendation of the Governor's present Tax Revision Committee to provide for such in the same manner as does the Federal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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classification which operates on the rather thoughtless assumption
that a head of household family has a greater ability to pay taxes than
a married couple, but less than a single individual.

This recommendation

will not be surprising as it appeared to be some of the unfinished
business of past tax revision committees.
It is interesting to review the minutes of the Tax Revision Com-

mittee (on file in the State Capital Archives).

The Committed was em-

powered by the 1967 Legislature to study Utah's taxes

~lith

the "view of

effecting a more equitable distribution of the tax burden and to prepare
bills provided" and specifically to "study the adjustability or feasibility
of coordinating the Utah Income Tax Act" with the Federal law. (Utah Code
Annotated, Section 20 (2-3) (Supp. 1971).
The first Federally based tax bill submitted to the Legislature in
1969 contained only one tax rate schedule (S. 21, 38th Legislature, 1969).
It appeared that as the Committee and the Legislature got more involved
in trying to parallel the Federal structure they felt that they had to
give up either the one rate structure or continue with what they thought
was an administrative burden which was married persons having to file
separate returns.

What finally won out was a variable rate structure

which would encourage married filing joint returns.
In the process, it appears that what this action might do to the
existing equitability of the system was disregarded and thus a new inequity was created mearly on the basis of accomodating the inflexible
sacred cow of the joint return as if it were an unquestionable "given."
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Although not directly at issue in this case, it is worth noting
that an equally nonsensical situation exists under the Federal system
in regard to the so-called "marriage penalty"

~there

a couple filing

jointly mny claim only a $3,200 standard deduction, whereas each partner
before marriage (or if living together as unmarried) can claim a $2,200
standard deduction.

So in this case it isn't just the unmarried who

are the victims of unreasonable tax policy descrimination.
What are we left with then that is still at issue.

It has been

established that, (at least in regard to the "head of household" category)
... "there is no fair reason for the law that would not require equally
its extension to those it leaves untouched."

(Article 1, Section 24,

Utah State Constitution).
We now have the most difficult task which is trying to convince
many who bel' "te 'yet would never admit it) that the si11gle status
can be equdteJ with sin and the single parent as tainted or at least
irresponsible, which somehow leaves them with a greater ability to pay
taxes not only because they have more money but because they are part
of an undesirable social cost and therefore merit such.
Someone once said "When you go through the grocery line, they
don't ask you your marital status and ring you up on another cash register."

What more can one say?

Expenses of people, no matter v1hat their

marital status and life style are much more similar than dissimilar.
In general, any savings of expenses on the part of the unmarried is
compensated for by a married couple's ability to pool resources, and
likewise the lack of having the expense of children on the part of singles
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is compensated (at least as much as should reasonably be expected) with
the exemption provision and the fact that singles pay (through property
and othet· taxes) a substantial portion towards the expense of educating
other peoples' children.
Therefore as a result of being unreasonably and arbitrarily
classified the appellant and his former wife were required to pay
additional amounts of 1973 State income tax over 1972 of $84.00 and
approximately $18.00 respectively on the same dollar income.

This increase

is mostly attributable to the "single and head of household tax penalty"
and not the increase in tax rates from 1972 to 1973.
The position of the appellant is therefore that the only sensible,
reasonable and fair way of taxing people is based on the ability to pay on
income and any other extension of the "ability to pay" has no validity
when making classifications for taxing purposes based on marital status
and personal life style.

Any such consideration, to be equitable, must

be provided for through individual exemptions and itemized deductions.
The appellant would take issue with one statement in Article 1,
Section 24 of the State Constitution which states ... "In fixing the limits
of the class, the legislative body has a wide discretion; and the
Supreme Court may not concern itself with the wisdom or policy of the law."
Let it only be said that if there were ever any truth to such a statement,
that tilfle has long past.

Almost by definition (now days) that is pre-

cisely what courts of appeal and supreme courts do do--is concern themselves with the wisdom and policy of law and its effects, call it by
what narne you may.
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POINT II:

That portion of the present Utah State Income Tax which
bases tax rates on marital status and personal life style
is a "special lavi'' which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah State Constitution states that
"the Legislature is prohibited from enacting any private or special laws"
in certain enumerated cases, one of which is "assessing and collecting
taxes."
Although what is termed as "special laws" is not defined, a General
law is defined as:

"Laws which apply to and operate uniformly upon all

members of any class of persons, places, or things, requiring legislation
peculiar to themselves in the matters covered by the laws in question, are
general and not soecial."
The
tions

!

qLc5~~on

c:•:Jd~'

·'·~

nere then is do the legislatively created classifica-

marital status and personal life style for taxing purposes

really require legislation peculiar to themselves?

Present la1·1 by

definition gives "special" consideration to those living within the legal
framework of marriage.

Are the circumstances of persons in that category

so special that they be allowed to pay less taxes than their single or
head of household counterparts v1ith the same taxable income and comparable
expenses? The appellant maintains that under an irnpartial judgement the
answer must be no.
POINT III:

That portion of the present Utah State Income Tax which bases
tax rates on marital status and personal life style denies
one equal protection and benefit of the law.

Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of Utah states that:
"All political pov1er is inherent in the pcorle; and all free governments
are founded on their authority fot' their N]ual protection and benefit,
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and they have the right to alter or reform their government as the public
welfare may require."
The appellant maintains that having variable tax rates based on
marital status and personal life style in effect results in having two
or more laws which apply to groups of people arbitrarily created by the
Legislature which when analyzed it will be found as reiterated before
" ... that there is no fair reason for the law that would not require
equally its extension to those which it leaves untouched (Article I,
Section 24).
It is therefore a contradiction in terms to claim equal protection
and benefit of the law when the existing law is in fact a multiplicity
of laws which are administered in a discriminatory manner, and based on
assumptions that are irrelevant to the requirements of the objective in the
first place which is to tax income and not people.
The other side of the coin of "due process" is "equal protection."
The appellant, in having the Supreme Court review this appeal, has
received due process.

He is now requesting equal protection for him-

self and thousands of other residents of the State under one tax rate,
as it is impossible to have such under two or more laws that apply to
the same thing, and that same thing is equal amount of taxable income.
POINT IV:

That portion of the present Utah State Income Tax which
bases tax rates on marital status and personal life style
is a usruption of "Fundamental Rights" which are deemed
essential under the Constitution.

Article I, Section 27 of the Utah State Constitution states that
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the
security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government."
The appellant acknowledges the necessity of legislative and legal
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of government, however, he also sees that such precedence is a mixed
blessing and at times a curse.

An honest and enlightened appraisal of

such would confirm this to be the case.

The legislative and legal approach

of today is too often an excess of justifying current action by the past
without sufficient regard to letting (whatever is being considered) be
judged on its own merits rather than questionable past precedence.
An appropriate example (excepting it is on the Federal level)
is the reversing of the long held acceptability of the "separate but equal"
interpretation in

Plessy v Ferguson (1896).

At that time the Court said

that a law which recognizes a difference in color "has no tendency to
destroy the legal equality of the two races."

Also adding that the

Fourteenth Ammendment was not intended to enforce "soci a 1, as distinguished
from

pol

ra~-,,

wl':

i:i cal equality."

If the enforced segregation "stamps the colored

che badge of inferiority, it is solely because the race chooses

to put that construction upon it."
Unfortunately it took the Court nearly 60 _,, 'rs to realize there 1;as
something very fundatmentally wrong with previous lines of reasoning and
logic.

In Brown v Board of Education (1954), the Court stated that

separate facilities (in education) were "inherently unequal" and that
continuance by the states would breach the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth

Amrr~ndment.

The Utah State Supreme Court is well aware of the ramifications of
this decision in all phases of civil rights since 1954.

The issue of

taxation based on marital status and life style is no less of a civil
rights issue.

Similar assumptions of the "separte but equal" mentality

pervade today's justification of existing tax policy.

One might rephrase

the statement h'·'" Plessy: Ferg_rJ_s_D__fl_ by saying that "0 la1-1 which recognize
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a difference in (marital status or life style) has a tendency to destroy
the 1ega 1 equa 1ity of the (groups being taxed .l"

At 1east the Court can

be assured that the frustration, anger, and resultant disrespect for
unfair (if not oppressive) taxation on the part of many is not just
because they "choose to put that construction upon it," it is because
it is "inherently unequal."

As to the precedence that has developed now for 30 years, it is
due time for those who are in control and sit in judgement to begin
asking why are we doing things the way we are and upon what justification, and have our actions been arbitrary or unreasonable?
For the security of individual rights, this issue demands the
"recurrence to fundamental principles" and this is what the appellant
is requesting the Utah State Supreme Court to do.

Please, for the

moment, discard the traditional mode of legal justification which uses
the past as a standard for the future.
The Constitution deems it as essential that you at times focus
on fundamental principles and this cannot be done fairly by using precedence as a crutch or a substitute for original thinking.
POINT V:

That portion of the present Utah State Income Tax which
bases tax rates on marital status and personal life style
is a denial of religious freedom and rights of conscience.

Article 1, Section 4 to the Constitution states that "The rights
of conscience shall never be infringed.

The State shall make no law

respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exerci se thereof."
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The Court may think it rather naive on the part of the appellant
to appeal to the "rights of conscience" in defending his position.
If so, you are probably right if such stops at mere belief without
action.

History has shown that an appeal to a natural or higher lav1

has always gotten its adherents into trouble, but this will no doubt
always be the case.
The appellant's point is quite direct and simple.

He, as a matter

of conscience (religion) believes (and without qualification) in paying
his share of taxes to support the public "good."

However, as a correlary,

he also believes with the same conviction that being forced to pay more
than his share is theft on the part of the government and an evil which
is in precisely the same category as tax evasion.
As f3ith without works is dead, likewise is belief without action.
Thi.:c

vi'

1

.roe appe: llant has no choice tiut to refuse to voluntarily pay

the unjust tax under discussion.
The making of an "ability to pay" determination beyond that based
on equivelent taxable income amounts, is a moral judgement, which (however
desirable) is one that courts and particularly legislative bodies are
illsuited to do.
It makes just as much sense to tax a person based on their sex,
religion, or where they live as to do so through classification by
marital status and life style.

In fact it would make more sense to

do so based on sex as males traditionally have higher incomes than females,
and that isn't mere speculation or wishfull thinking.
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If the Utah State Legislature, either individually or collectively
had the wisdom of Solomon, the appellant would defer to its judgement.
But as that hardly seems likely in his lifetime he cannot as a matter of
conscience do so,as anything less would be a betrayal of his own integrity
and a compromise of "the free exercise" of his religious convictions.
SUMMARY
In presenting his argument the appellant has tried to take what was
a common sense approach to him.

Not being a lawyer he hasn't been privy

to the nuances of that profession which may have helped in his presentation.
Nonetheless, the appellant believes he has sufficiently established the
following so as to allow the Court to grant the relief sought:
That the provision(s) of the 1973 Individual Income Tax of the
State of Utah which provide for basing tax rates on marital status
and personal life style is unconstitutional or violates the intent
of such because:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

It
It
It
It
It

is an unreasonable and arbitrary legislative classification.
is a "special law."
violates the concept of "equal protection and benefit of the law."
is a usurption of the "fundamental rights" of individuals.
is an infringement of the right of conscience and free exercise
of religion.

The appellant would appeal to the Court to reflect on the words of
Oliver vlendell Holmes, Jr. who said, "The law is the witness and eternal
deposit of our moral life.

Its history is the history of the moral

development of the race."

Gentlemen, you are in a unique position to

assist in that moral development which is so sorely needed.

Please do so.
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In conclusion, (and v1ith all due respect to the Court), if it sees

fit not to grant the relief sought on this appoal, the appellant can
only say that he tried, and then echo the \'lOrds of Charles Dickens 1·1ho
once said, "If that's the law, then the lav1 is an ass."

CERTIFICATE
Ten copies of the foregoing appellant's Brief were delivered
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in care of the clerk of
the Supreme Court, State Capital Building, Salt Lakc:e City, Utah;
and two copies of the same were mailed to Bruce N. Hale, Attorney
for Plaintiff end Respondent, 235 State Capital Building, Salt Lake
Ci"':y. :J:ah 8~114, this~ day of September, 1978.
~Ja''"'''

.. !'.ight, ProSe

Appe 11 ant
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(!:.te 3.:! ~ 5').::;~ :.'>H 'IC
hence. not dPdue:Uble ,a_s a ,_ i:-.Un p 2'aln -~t

the c:::tatc und2r

sc-r~tion

2U.1:J (:".d {2).

Fin3Uy, cve:n if tllt: r,•cJrd ~D 1 'lcJ:tcd
the concll..L.s;on th:o.t tJ1cre w:L·:; fUll LJ.d
a.dcq•.tc~te
.Cl'n:;,id<:.ration i..r., y;10n.r~y or
money's :\'.~orth ior t.~lC a::! c~':'li~·nt. if ~~L _v
28, lrl-17, we v:ould cl'm.ci.uu-2 tlH;t T>Cli-

tiouer h:tS fai.l".'d to estJ..bE:h th~ • Ue-

ductilJilit~·

of the

tion v.ith rc~l

'-.'Ct

~1.50,000.

Th~: <::-~-:n~i.!a

to ~~r..e settlc:rnent ri-t.1t-·J

Jo,Iay 12. lf,Gi), Tcdtcs ..;.,:; c'>:LSbe:!.':tion

for the SJ 50,•)00 settlement d~striUutivn
the following:
* ,. • in full scttleme-:.t o:t 311 clc-•i:n.s
and

di<1~Uti~:1

r.:::J.'lti..-:g to (1) "":he agT2'2-

ment bctwce!'l
dn.t~U.

l\fay

~s.

::-.1~·.

and

).f~-s.

LJza~

19 ~-~ l;i; the a:n·cL:n":r.;:

of trust of Lena G. V.:iz;,~r (..lclted F· Cruary 14-, 1963, (iii) the various \\lEs o.~
Una G. Laz::r ~r.d ('~:r) th~ cst._lte of
Lf>na G. L~~ar, • * •
The sti.puL:.ti0n dxs not

<l.p~·ntioa

the

$150,000 &"t":lenwnt di-str~bt;.Li0n ro t.lte
fou.r (k~sig:J.ated b?ses of thr- cl:~im3 rA
Susan R. Simon, et aL Peht"I,~::J..'l' has pr~
sc:r.ted no evidence upon which a r>-::;c::onablc apportionment of ;_t.nv n.r;:t vi t:~2
$150,000 .:::cttleln,;nt Cist;:-ib1_;ti0n conld be
mad~ to U1e rl§;hls of ~:;l.::;:1J1 ?... Simon. f•t
al., 8.9 third party cLli:nu.nrs tmcl.·~r ti1e
agre':'mcnt dated 1-fay 2S, ~d-17, e.s CJ..Sti..o~;-...:::::::.~ ~

::--:·:-.~

't~~._'.:-

~ ~ ,~~

._..._..

·~·-··· u-

CiarieSJ cf tile tc.st.'lmeEtarv estate under
prior '\\Tills or otherv..-is'!. Tiu:r.-::-fore. netitloncr would still ha·.-e failed to Cfitai:l:~ ·n
the deductibility of tile Sl50,000 settle-

ment di'.::.iribution or any '[l:J.rt thc-rt.of
under section 2053. R~yethon Production
Corporation, 1 'l'.C. 952 ! 1943), aff'd.
1H F.2d 100 [32 AFTR 1155] (C.A. 1,
1914).

Decision w-ill be entered for respondent.

[1158.56] 58 TC No. 5G. VIVIE._"<
KELLE:,!S. Docket No. 427-70. 6-27-72.
Opinion by \VITHEY, J. Ye:1r 19G3.
Decision for Commissioner.

David R. Shelton, for :he p..:;titioner.
DaV.:d J',L Reizes 2....11d Barry D. Gvnion,
for the T2E~~nd~nt.

"A?rEEY, J1td,ae: P..espondent Uel:er~ined... ~

.rlcrle e_!lc:· i!". F'ede:-::1 h1coroc t4'.:
.._Jr pr:L-1tioc2r !:or t..he year tndtd Decen1.~:t::;, ~

t:ne amc·unt of $813.3J.
has 2.!.so den.:ed peti.tioner's
CJ.3.lll1 _fol' re~d o: ta..":f;s :or t..lJ.e same
year 1n the arr~ount of ~2,939.13. Tbe
i.s::l:'t~ raised by way cf the notir:e ot
d_eficien,:;y f:avir g b~n concMerl t-y p=t!.~onE'r at the tir,Le ci t!~~.l, the r·;m"'i.::J.i"'1g
L~s~J~ 1s ':.~e alloY\".1.thlty of peitior..er'.i
cls~rr. fo:;:- ref'Jnd ·,vh-:rh is b:ts ...--d uoon the
2.Ss.::n.; en that the compcrt<1t1.:m Ot "D~ti
~-:L..lner s t<.tx throur;h the use of ~tes
-1pfliC3.ble to sinzle peroc•ns :r-c.tl:er ths..,
m?.T!"ieC. pt:r.zcn.s cOJ>citu.t~d an unconst!tu+-i0n"'.l cl::< <:.:;i13ca:Uo:n.
btr 21,

r:c-~nr:-::er.t

Fli'-7DINGS OF FAGr

Pditior.er, a sin~le per<:~.:>n from 194.7
to the time of trial of this caf-le, resided
::.:t East Haddam, Connecticut, a.t the
Erne ot' :6.1in~,; the peti+..w1J.. Both netitio~~.e,.. s ::!.9(,.5 indi"vidual rdli.rl and cl:;im
for refund were riled wi'ch the district
direotor of incernal revenue, HartioJ.·d,
Coru:.ecticut.
ThE~ tax on petitioner's return, as
filed, wz.s compute-d by petitio:ter on the
basis of the !'tites set fcr+..h in sect!:)l..
l(J.) (2) of t...~e Int~al Revenue Code
of 1954 as amended through 3965.

OPINION

TAX ON L'IDIVID"GALS-Rates of
tax--constitution3Jity. Fe-deral income
tax laws as c.tpplif'd. to sin:;le taxpayer
e.re constitution:ll. Compuv.lion of t.J...xpayer's ta_x through use of r~ltes :Lpplicable i.o single per~ons rc~t..iler than
marriC'd person:: <.lldn't colli>i.ltute uncon.stitulional cla:~siiica.tion. Ref: 1972
P-H Fed. U3<27.

Having conceded the only issue with
reg<.mi tu the notice oi deficiency, petitioner claims entitlement to a refund of
inciJme tax paid for 1965. The bo.~..s for
petitioner's claim is that U1e proVIS.icns
of the Ir1tern~ Revenue Oode prov:iding
a rate of t.Rx <1.pplicable to petitioner,
who .is a sin~le person, higher than the
ra.te a{>pEc3.ble to joint returns of
married pt'rsons are unoonsti tutioiL.."tl

Of/icWl Tax Court Sl/l!!lbus

Rnd. in viob.tic.·n 0f tl:.e fifth, ninth, four-

[11 PdiUonc>r, a ~iJ1~~~,;; :;ocr:::on, com-....-~'.!:t.t.:e~~th, and ~~ . .--te~r:.th
.
alllendm('nta &ad,
putod
t.:a.x Law
en Ul(J
iJo.UJ:.J Qi ~::~~-c. ltC!.) t.:?.)_,
a.rt.J.c1!j by
1, ~ct4vn 2a cla.U3e 31 and ~ol~
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the~ ..... person."! m·~rri•2d or s;ng-le OLlts:ch: of community property stat~.-.;; nor \':ould P(llJ:dity be achi~_·vcd if the: income-::p~tttin:::;
deYicc ·were extenci~~n unl~· to .'olf!g-lo persons .::md m:1..rric~l p~._--.r:--.ons filLTig- joint
achiev.._.

returns, brcc1U:Se the:r
\V01__l]d

l):}\'

rl

ffil_~ ]'

o .;:;i-:1;b person

}O'.'"tC'l

:~:·

'-,_:;.!"'!.

+::_~

po..Cl by a m<:"i!TiEd f•0!"'S:')I' ',\·ho tiled a

t.:Jx

7-7-72

rr GB ..):; P-TJ 'l'O

sep:n<1te n·t11!"11. Furthcrm:;rt"~ :1 sin;le
per.:::on would abo p.L_\' a t:lx lo\\·er th:m
tJ1e eflcctin' hx on the :-::une -:J1Nme of a
martit'U v:'r5'0TI \\'hO~·? SI•OUE"e :J.bO h3d
significant inC'n:nt:> (both of whose incomes were incl,Hied on a j0int return).
}..fore importantly·, howe\·er, Conc::--rc::.s
was \\ithin the bounds of its constitutional role since it is concei\'ablc Congress belicYed tr.at rr.arried persons
generally have ~re:1ter .fi..."'13nci:J.l burdens
than single pcr:::ons. 6 The recognition of
such greater bunL'ns is certainly consorn..nt with taxation b1sod o~ :.he ~1bility
to puy, which 11cts lon~ been an rm~;ort2.11t
ohjPcti\"C:' of tlw i'1cc•me Llx scheme. The
degrc>f' of H'N1;~rution ;:::-i\'Pn b~· CDn~Tt'SS
to U1c proOkrn of ~r(\lter tin.111cial burdens on thr pa! t of the m:nTic>ci ta."'{paycrs (see fpotnntc 1,
v:as also
with1n the d1:--rr·~t~on ol
smce
it dov-; not app, 1r ;t~'bltraty or unrc::t:on-

'F~urthennore, U:e face akt t~c
incomc-<plittin~
device
g-ra.."'l.ts
the
greJ.t(c:-t amount of tax J'eduction to th'l:::;.e
incomes simply reflects the
r<.'tte ~tructurc Gf th2 Internal
Code. This factor i:a no Wl-y
n':'~·<Jtc·s tlw idea Uwt the provi3ion v:as
un 2.cknov:lcdgmerit of the: pTeatcr fin~
anci~ll burdens of marri.::d pe-r::::otls since
in an~· gl\"En incon:e catez-or:-· the rnar~
ried pcr."on filing jomtly will pay le5s
LLX tj8Jl a single person ha\·ins Lhe s3.me
mc:omc.'

CJhle.

Petitioner's faith in Hoeper v. TJ.x
2S1 U.S. 206 [10 AFI'R
.J.;:",S] (1931 I, a:1d sim1lar ~aS~3 i3 misplaced. In Hn<.?p<:r the Ccurt ·w:1s dealing
w.th a \Yi.::;con3in income tax statute
v:h;ch adcl•"d a wif8's earnings to her
hus"t>~ill(..l'.'.> t<~xable income. The Court
,,t _t[_,-_:.J <J..t pa;;e 217, "It can hcrdly be
c.:lJiJ;;ed that a mere di£ference in social
nlatior~ so J.lters the t..a:{able status of
on2 receh"in~ incom0 JS to justify a
rL.'Ierent m~a'3ure for the tax." The distindicm i:Y!l\\·ecn Hoeper rL'l.\1 the present c:tse JS that in EO<'!•e:- the state
\\':1s atle1•1ptmg to t"'X tn th~ husband
e~ rmng:? \\ hkh were not hi.-:, v:hc~eas in
this u.se Congress is applying a diifcrcnt rctte of tax to earnin~s conceded
t0 be petii.ioner's It i;:> fnll.v v"ithin U;e
·10wcr of Con;rcs.s t.1 ena..t pl'OVI~ioPs
Com~l~i:o-Jirm,

,'-J.i c; .. r;_; 01" Tt1<:U.t.i.)J;.:;

t!l·

clitLL f.1l

LiJ.Z

-::-aJuatf'd rate:s. subject tJ t11e restricc;:;cussed above; th:J.t is. if the
cf>~.1_!1'?e in the 1aie structUl·e 1s not equ..'1.l
:15 bct·•:ecn cl:ls.ses cf taxpayers, there
must be> a rational Oasis for the distinction. In this case the geogr8phic equa~
liz.o.!:ion of taxpayers as bch\·et:n commlmitv and non-community states and
the r~co.s'11ition of tJ1e greater financial
burdens or' married persons provide such
rettional basis.
Derision win be entered for the re~
spon..dent.

tion

l[ft 38.51] 58 TC No. 57. ALFONSO
DIAZ and ~BRIA de ,JESt:S IH.tl,
Docket No. 71-!-71. 6-29-72. O;·inion by
T.\.XciENWALD, J. Year 19GG. Decision
:!:'or T.:t.-....::payer.
L'-"CO:'tn:: To whom taxable umowlts received by othPrs-\vhethf'lr in·
come to Utxpayer. Taxpayer's inG-ome

fb1d. Ed 2:17.
e It 1l<'C'll nnt

r;

of
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